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Abstract: The terms modernity and capitalism remain in widespread use to characterize 
contemporary societies, but the distinction between them is much less antagonistic in 
current social theory than it used to be at the time when a theory of “modern society” 
was opposed to the theory of “late capitalism”. Rather than seeing societies either on an 
evolutionary trajectory realizing the functionally efficient institutionalization of freedom 
or as determined by increasing contradictions due to the logics of capital and to class 
struggle, a key task of social theory today is to reconceptualize modernity and 
capitalism in such a way that the dynamics of historical transformations and the 
varieties of current socio-political constellations can be more adequately understood. 
This article contributes to addressing this task, introducing a special issue devoted to 
“modernity and capitalism”. This introduction elaborates a concept of modernity 
focused on the interpretative self-understanding of societies and a concept of capitalism 
as a historically specific response to the question of satisfying human material needs. 
On this conceptual basis, a historical-comparative perspective is taken to analyze 
transformations in the self-understandings of societies and the institutional changes in 
organizing the economy related to the former, placing the comparative analysis of 
societies in the global context of transformations of modernity and capitalism. 
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Despite their widespread use, it is not at all evident, much less agreed, what the terms 
“modernity” and “capitalism” refer to in current social theory. Each of them has its 
rather separate conceptual history. “Modernity” today often replaces the term “modern 
society”, key concept in modernization theory, and thus descends from Talcott Parsons 
and is connected with the idea of functional differentiation as a higher state of evolution 
of socio-political organization. “Capitalism”, in turn, points back to Karl Marx (who 
never used the noun) and the idea of fundamental contradictions in current socio-
political organization, not to be resolved without a major social transformation. But 
both concepts appear to have shed the strong connotations. Rather than being a model, 
“modernity” is now seen to exist in plural forms and constitutes a “field of tensions” 
(Arnason, 1991). And instead of bound to be overcome, “capitalism” is often considered 
to be without alternative as a way of organizing the economy, even if in a variety of 
rather stable ways with different functional advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
It is not the purpose of this article to further survey the field of current usage (see, in 
this journal, Arnason, 2015, for further discussion). Rather we aim at making a 
conceptual proposal that links the two terms – and thus two largely separate traditions 
of thought – to each other in a plausible way and allows for further comparative-
historical investigations of configurations of modernity and capitalism. The starting-
point is the observation that both the analysis of modern society/modernity in 
mainstream social theory and the analysis of capitalism in critical social theory have 
analyzed institutional forms in a rather mechanical way and derived a logic of 
coordination or conflict and of evolutionary or transformative dynamics from such 
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forms. As a consequence, the view of one key institution, markets, as either integrated 
into an overall institutional framework of society or as conditioning all other institutions 
led to the well-known opposition between affirmative and critical theory. Furthermore, 
the formal institutional emphasis has led to debates about the comparative merits of 
institutional arrangements for various purposes, such as the “states” versus “markets” 
debate, limiting the scope of investigation. 
 
To overcome these limitations, we suggest to analyze socio-political constellations first 
of all from the angle of the meaning human beings give to them. Institutions, then, are 
seen as sedimentations of meaning.i This proposal can draw on re-theorizations of 
modernity over the past three decades (see Wagner, 2012: ch. 2 for an overview), but it 
is much less common for analyses of capitalism (a significant exception is Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 1999). Thus, our first step will be a reconceptualization of modernity in 
relation with capitalism. We will do so by referring to the re-interpretation of the world 
that occurred in the late eighteenth century and draw conceptual conclusions from these 
historical observations. Secondly, we will discuss the relation between this 
interpretative and the institutional approach to the social world, spelling out the 
differences between them without, however, creating a new and unfruitful opposition. 
Thirdly, we will employ the interpretative approach to develop a comparative-historical 
perspective on constellations of modernity and capitalism, not least with a view to 
rethinking the relation between the historical “core” areas of capitalism and its supposed 
periphery. Finally, we will draw some conclusions for applying this interpretative 
approach to the current constellation of modernity and capitalism. 
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The place of capitalism in the modern imaginary 
 
The late-eighteenth century revolutions have often been seen as laying the foundations 
for the institutional structures of “modern societies”, most importantly a capitalist 
market economy and a modern democratic state. At a closer look, however, actual 
institutional practices often changed rather little on both sides of the Atlantic during 
much of the nineteenth century, somewhat more so in the Americas than in Europe, an 
insight captured by Arno Mayer's (1985) phrase about “the persistence of the Old 
Regime”. What had occurred, rather, was a “rupture in societal consciousness” 
(Koselleck and Reichardt, 1988), which set social and political imagination on a new 
trajectory. Thus, that which often is referred to as the “birth of the modern world” 
(recently Bayly, 2004) is first of all a look at the world in new terms, a re-interpretation 
of the world. 
 
There are good reasons to doubt whether this moment should be called the onset of 
modernity, but we will not discuss them here (see Wagner, 2015a, for further 
discussion). The main reason why this moment indeed can be referred to as the onset of 
modernity is the forceful emergence of a new social and political imaginary focused on 
the concept of autonomy. Rooted in Enlightenment thought, autonomy became the 
guiding idea for notions of human rights, for freedom of expression, for liberty of 
commerce, and collectively as the commitment to self-determination as popular 
sovereignty and democracy. While practices of autonomy were rarely institutionalized, 
the idea of autonomy guided social and political struggle further on. We can consider 
the period around 1800 as a significant moment of modernity, if we understand by 
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modernity a socio-political situation marked by the commitment to autonomy. This is a 
first building-block for exploring the relation between modernity and capitalism. 
 
Two specifications can be added that allow us to go on. First, the commitment to 
autonomy indicates the ways through which those questions will be addressed that all 
societies have to answer: how to satisfy material needs, how to decide about and 
implement the rules for the life in common, and how to identify the knowledge sources 
upon which one can rely. We can call those questions the economic, the political and 
the epistemic problématique respectively (Wagner, 2008). Under conditions of 
autonomy, there is no one else to provide answers to these questions; they have to be 
found and determined on one's own. 
 
Secondly, autonomy does not simply mean freedom, though the terms are often used 
synonymously. Autonomy means to give oneself one's own laws. Therefore, the idea of 
autonomy already contains a reference to mastery, namely to establish the law that 
henceforth is to guide one's own action. In the same move, a tension is created: once 
there is a law to be followed, there is potentially a limit to freedom (for more detailed 
discussion see Wagner, 2015b: ch 4). 
 
These specifications permit us to understand certain conceptualizations of modernity 
and capitalism better. Some authors operate within an unduly strong separation of the 
two; others tend to conflate them. In historical terms, for instance, Ellen Meiksins Wood 
(1999) sees the origins of capitalism in the Industrial Revolution and thus locates them 
in Britain, whereas the origins of modernity are to be found in the French Revolution. In 
conceptual terms, the identification of autonomy and mastery as the imaginary 
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signification of modernity is due to Cornelius Castoriadis (see Arnason, 1989). 
However, he equates the commitment to autonomy with democracy and the 
commitment to mastery – pseudo-rational pseudo-mastery, as he liked to put it – with 
capitalism. For both authors, the two phenomena are entirely disconnected. Critically, 
they see capitalism as undermining democracy and autonomy. In contrast, the 
mainstream Marxist tradition tended to see the French Revolution as a “bourgeois 
revolution” driven by the interests of the capitalist class, thus subordinating the political 
transformation to the economic transformation. 
 
Neither of these approaches is adequate in the light of our earlier conceptual reflections. 
The political problématique addresses different concerns from the economic one; the 
two should not be conflated. At the same time, democracy can be equated with 
autonomy only if the inherent component of mastery is also considered. A democratic 
polity needs to assure that the self-given laws are also followed. The modern 
understanding of a commercial society, in turn, is also based on the view that the actions 
of autonomous human beings relating to each other through commercial exchange will 
tend to enhance domestic peace and create greater “wealth of nations” (Hirschman, 
1977; Casassas, 2010). Thus, neither a full separation of modernity from capitalism nor 
the identification of the one with the other is a fruitful conceptual strategy to understand 
the relations between the two. 
 
Let us then return to the starting-point to elaborate a more adequate strategy. We have 
introduced the term modernity to refer to a societal self-interpretation based on the 
commitment to autonomy, which was strongly expressed at around 1800. This was a 
comprehensive self-understanding, the term autonomy potentially applying to all walks 
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of life. At the same time, the commitment to autonomy does not lend itself to 
straightforward institutionalization. It is ridden with tensions and in need of more 
specific interpretation, most importantly with regard to the relation between personal 
freedom and collective self-determination and with regard to the relation between 
autonomy as instituting society, to use Castoriadis's terms, and the mastery that results 
from following already instituted rules. This openness of the commitment to autonomy 
to interpretation leads to a potentially rather wide range of different societal self-
understandings based on this commitment. 
 
Capitalism, in turn, is a term that, we propose, should be seen as referring to one way of 
addressing the economic problématique. In very general terms, then, on the one hand, 
the meaning of modernity exceeds the one of capitalism in the sense that it refers to a 
general societal self-understanding, which includes the economic problématique as one 
aspect. But, on the other hand, the economic problématique needs to be addressed under 
all circumstances, and we need to understand how capitalism came to be a way of doing 
so after the modern moment of an emerging strong commitment to autonomy.  
 
Two observations are central for answering this question: First, the rise of the modern 
imaginary of autonomy in the late eighteenth century included the notion that the 
economic problématique, too, can be addressed on the basis of autonomy. Making 
commercial bonds between free human beings more significant would lead to better 
satisfaction of material needs, due not least to the increase of productivity in a more 
specialized economy based on a pronounced division of labour.ii This was the core 
reasoning of what we now know as classical political economy, and it was historically 
unprecedented. Until this moment, the ancient Greek idea had prevailed that household 
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matters had their rules (“eco-nomos”) that needed to be followed; there was no space for 
autonomy in this regard. 
 
Whether this was an “argument for capitalism before its triumph”, as Albert Hirschman 
(1977) had put it, is less certain. It was rather an argument for commercial society or 
market society, a society in which autonomous producers encounter each other on 
markets for the exchange of the product of their labour. A definition of capitalism, 
though, should arguably – we return to this question below – include the distinction 
between two social groups, those who own significant property and those who only 
have their labour-power to sell. This distinction should become central for the “critique 
of political economy” and the socialist/communist political tradition. 
 
What happened between the late eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth 
century, secondly, was a major re-interpretation of modernity. Politically, the late-
eighteenth-century revolutions often combined the call for personal liberty with the one 
for democracy, but in the course of events the concern for order and control overrode 
the one for collective self-determination, with an orientation towards mastery through 
statecraft exercised by elites, in turn increasingly to be opposed by social movements. 
Economically, the combination of economic freedom with the Industrial Revolution led 
to what Marx called “concentration and centralization of capital”, the creation of 
industrial factories with large numbers of workers. In other words, the transformations 
both had a double orientation: The political revolution was liberal and democratic, with 
the former, restricted to elites, prevailing over the latter. The economic revolution had a 
commercial and an industrial component, with the latter over time prevailing over the 
former. In short, one can say that the orientation towards mastery by elites over the 
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majority of the population and over nature came to dominate over a generalized 
orientation towards autonomy (see Wagner, 2015b, for a general reasoning along those 
lines).  
 
This is what we have come to know as the societies of “modern capitalism”, a 
combination of “restricted liberal modernity” (Wagner, 1994) and an industrial 
economy. A major theorem of critical social theory suggested that such “modern 
capitalism”, though born out of the spirit of modernity, undermines the basic 
commitment of modernity to autonomy. Leda Maria Paulani as well as Antoni 
Domènech and María Julia Bertomeu refer to this theorem in their contributions, aiming 
to retrieve it in novel ways by applying it to specific trajectories of modernity and 
capitalism, in Paulani's contribution, or widening its conceptual connotations, in 
Domènech and Bertomeu's contribution. Max Weber's observations on the “spirit of 
capitalism” that escapes from the iron cage and is no longer needed once the institutions 
of such capitalism are in place had provided a major example of such analysis. When 
reading Weber today we have to keep in mind that he provided an analysis of a certain 
historical constellation of modernity and capitalism, one in which institutions had 
become so firmly sedimented that the structures of meaning that had led to their creation 
are forgotten. This historical constellation proved to be much more limited in time and 
space than Weber thought. Thus, we have to reopen the question of the relation between 
meaning-providing interpretations and institutions as a guide for comparative analyses 
of other historical trajectories of modernity and capitalism as well as of the current 
constellation.  
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Agency, interpretation and institution 
 
The sociology of “modern society” had suggested that there is an univocal package of 
institutions – including "the (modern) market", "the (modern) state" – that mechanically 
unfolds across history. However, historical evidence shows that a variety of different 
configurations of such markets and states emerged as the result of socio-political 
decisions taken by – a few or the majority of – the people. What "the market" means 
and can become, what "the state" means and can give rise to is something that results 
from dense sets of social interaction processes without closure. Institutions are 
constructed and maintained in the light of interpretations of given socio-political 
situations. There is no social institution that is not the object of collective appraisal and 
configuration – a claim that does not deny the presence of conflict and even political 
exclusion in these institution-defining processes.   
 
Contrary to common misunderstandings an emphasis on interpretations is not in 
opposition to institutional analysis in general; it is only opposed to the hypostatization 
of certain institutional forms as model institutions of modernity. The contributions by  
Jeremy Seekings, Leda Maria Paulani and Rubén Lo Vuolo to this issue all focus on 
socio-political institutions that play a crucial role in the making of capitalist economies, 
such as markets, families, states and their public policies, etc. Rather than aiming to 
show how these “Southern” institutions – in South Africa and Latin America – either 
follow the “Northern” modern pattern or remain necessarily “incomplete” or “distorted” 
for some structural reason, as many similar analyses do, these analyses engage with the 
history of institutionalization as response to perceived problems and their interpretation. 
For this reason, institutions vary across societies and change over time, as individuals 
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and groups put their efforts into their shaping according to their world-views and 
interests. This applies to social-policy institutions (Lo Vuolo) as much as to core 
economic institutions (Seekings and Paulani). Unlike both economics and the sociology 
of functional differentiation want to make us believe, economic action is “always 
embedded” (Fred Block, with reference to Karl Polanyi) in society and subject to 
justifications with regard to the collectivity: the economy is to be seen “as a polity” 
(Joerges et al., 2005). The making of the economy is thus a social course entailing the 
acts of hearing (and silencing) voices, of juxtaposing bits of diversely conceived 
institutions, of administering the possible clashes of projects and interests. 
  
But if institutions are the outcome of action and interpretation, does that imply that they 
can be decomposed and completely reduced to small atomized component pieces? In 
other words: does it mean that the world is made of isolated atoms that limit themselves 
to make choices that are merely driven by individual desires and beliefs? Clearly, such 
ontological perspective stating that the world is just a big set of individual intentional 
psychologies was at the core of the neoclassical revolution. It followed up on the 
suggestion, mentioned above, that bonds by interest only should prevail between human 
beings, and “the motley feudal ties” (Marx and Engels) to be overcome, to create a more 
peaceful and more affluent world. And it finds its most recent form in rational-choice 
theorizing, ever more influential in the social and political sciences. By claiming that 
individual preference and interest are and should be all that counts, however, such 
ontology ignores the structure of social relations as it emerged from past interactions. If 
you sign a labour contract that turns you into a wage-earning worker, it is, from this 
angle, because you are not as risk-prone as the employer is. You psychologically prefer 
to delegate to the employer the perturbing managing tasks within the productive unit, 
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and the employer accepts the deal because s/he harbours the kind of psychological 
attributes and inclinations that are needed to run a business. Such psychological 
explanations of the running of labour markets and entire economies, which were absent 
within classical political economy (Casassas, 2013), deny the impact of power relations 
in all sorts of social structuring processes. The current constellation of modernity and 
capitalism may not lend itself as easily as the “modern capitalism” of Marx's and 
Weber's times to a two-class representation, but it does not for that reason come to 
resemble the aggregate of individual preferences either. Not recognizing the essentially 
conflicting nature of social life is what, according to Abba Lerner (1972), explains that 
economics became the "queen of social sciences" by becoming first the science of 
"solved political problems" - in the sense of nonexistent "political problems", of 
nonexistent power relations. 
 
But, to answer the question that has just been posed, stressing the importance of an 
interpretative approach to economic processes does not equal to psychologizing  
economic analysis. As Angelo Pichierri shows in his contribution to this issue, 
assuming that institutions are (re)interpreted by individuals and groups does not lead to 
an atomizing power-free portrait of how the economy works; rather, it urges us to give a 
precise account of the various ways in which individuals and groups generate 
intertwined – and at times conflicting – social orders that gain their legitimacy by 
forging a certain "common sense" on economic practices and social relations. And this 
is a social and political endeavour, nothing that emerges from summing up preferences. 
 
In sum, the approach we suggest here is threefold. Firstly, it seeks to trace those societal 
interpretative and meaning-giving processes that explain particular configurations of 
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socioeconomic institutions and arrangements – in this sense, it echoes Max Weber's 
project of a social science that comprehends specific interests and representations in the 
shaping of social life. On this basis, secondly, it aims at identifying key social 
institutions in the operation of the economic realm – in this sense, it is an approach that 
owes a lot to the longstanding "institutionalist" tradition, from Thorstein Veblen to Karl 
Polanyi and Elinor Ostrom. Thirdly, it intends to do so without denying the collective 
and conflicting nature of all these processes, for the constitution of our societies occurs 
in the context of material and symbolic power relations and cannot be understood as the 
sum of strictly individual actions the bases of which are psychological.  
 
 
Changing constellations of modernity and capitalism: a world-sociological 
perspective 
 
Having said this, the difficult task is to employ the approach that emphasizes agency 
and interpretation to investigate the long-term transformations of constellations of 
modernity and capitalism. There are few examples to draw on, and the most successful 
ones are in some way or other inspired by Karl Polanyi's path-breaking work The Great 
Transformation, first published in 1944.iii To recall, Polanyi analyzed the idea of market 
self-regulation as a particular interpretation of the economic question of need 
satisfaction, called disembedding of markets from society, and traced its historical 
application through the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, 
emphasizing movements for re-interpretation in the face of disastrous consequences as 
calls for re-embedding. Polanyi's work has been widely discussed and left a strong 
imprint on both historical sociology and economic sociology. His historical account has 
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also been criticized, not least for overemphasizing the actual impact of the idea of 
market regulation and for assuming homogeneity in the response by “society” in its 
“self-defence” (see, for instance, Halperin, 2005). Both appreciation and criticism need 
now to go some steps further: to refine Polanyi's perspective with a view to reviewing 
his account of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; to extend it towards 
analyzing the late-twentieth-century transformation of modernity and capitalism; and to 
go beyond the focus on Europe to elaborate a global and comparative analysis of 
constellations of modernity and capitalism. In different terms, the following articles can 
all be seen as contributions towards this endeavour. 
 
Drawing on her earlier critique of Polanyi but constructively re-employing Polanyi's 
terms “disembedding” and “re-embedding”, Sandra Halperin puts the European 
constellations of modernity and capitalism in global perspective. She underlines that the 
disembedding of markets from society during the nineteenth century was owed to an 
external orientation of the economies, through colonialism and imperialism, at the 
expense of fostering internal demand. But European elites became dependent on the 
masses for warfare in the twentieth century and accepted the politico-economic re-
embedding that became known as the democratic Keynesian welfare state, today on the 
verge of demise with a return to earlier patterns of external economic orientations. 
Jeremy Seekings's and Leda Maria Paulani's articles can be read as providing the 
complement to Halperin's analysis from a Southern angle. Seekings shows how the 
white South African elites aimed at emulating the Australian-British model of 
embedding the economy into society and, in particular, of integrating the working-class 
into a capitalist economy, a “model” adapted to the circumstances by formally 
excluding the majority of black African workers in the mines and in the households 
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from the institutional arrangements. Paulani starts out from the tension between 
modernity and capitalism that, in her view, makes itself felt in a particular way at “the 
periphery”, meaning that Brazilian elites always found it more convenient to reap 
profits by trading with the central economies rather than developing the domestic 
economy. Rather than seeing this as an inescapable fate of the periphery, though, 
Paulani reviews the historical and contemporary attempts at changing the scenario and 
explores their conditions of success and failure. 
 
Rubén Lo Vuolo's article continues the analysis of Latin American experiences, but in a 
comparative perspective and with a conceptual focus on the dimensions of autonomy 
and control in social policies. In particular, Lo Vuolo analyses cash transfer schemes as 
forms of social policy that, up to a certain point, are committed to the principle of 
autonomy that modernity entails. At the same time, he explores the extent to which their 
conditionalities end up creating a huge variety of forms of mastery that are used to 
control and discipline the lower classes across the continent. Lo Vuolo's article provides 
the bridge to the last three contributions, which focus on conceptual re-elaborations. 
When emphasizing the commodity relation, Polanyi indeed drew on a much earlier 
concern about rights to property and its implications for freedom, including the 
particular status of money, which it is useful to retrieve today. Domènech and 
Bertomeu's article revolves around these issues – with a particular attention to 
conceptual developments by the Salamanca School, John Locke and Karl Marx – and 
shows the importance of conceptualizing money not as a politically neutral device – as 
Locke did – but as a political creation with great implications in terms of shaping 
accumulation patterns. A political problematization of this particular "fictitious 
commodity" is thus needed in order to truly open the discussion about the kind of 
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economic world we (might want to) have. The relation between private and public 
matters, re-ideologized in the present by neo-liberal thinking, in turn, should be seen in 
the context of the varieties of justification for social orders. As shown by Angelo 
Pichierri in his article, re-embedding the economy into politics also means putting an 
end to the great public/private dichotomy and assuming that continuous societal 
decisions are to be made: on the nature we want to give to economic goods; on which 
social actors – or "social orders" – are expected to produce these goods; and on which 
property regimes are most desirable for these actors to operate with. Finally, retrieving 
key concerns of classical republican political philosophy, and in keeping with some of 
the analytical tools that are offered in the previous articles, David Casassas and Jurgen 
De Wispelaere develop a normative proposal that re-places economic matters at the core 
of modern democracy. On the one hand, democracy is to be understood as the outcome 
of decisions that are made by economically empowered individuals and groups – hence 
the importance of theoretical-political criteria on how to universally guarantee positions 
of social invulnerability for an autonomy-respecting interdependence to emerge. On the 
other hand, the institutional guarantee of such positions can be inimical to democracy 
itself if no channels for popular control and contestation are available. 
 
 
Self-determination in economy and society: re-conceptualizing the relation 
between modernity and capitalism 
 
It used to be very common to associate modernity with freedom and agency and  
capitalism with oppression and alienation. Our previous discussion has given some 
reasons why this was so, but also suggested that this is not the most fruitful conceptual 
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strategy. During the extended debates around 1800 about building societies on the 
principle of autonomy, one key suggestion was that the satisfaction of material needs 
could also best be achieved through autonomous human action. In some respect, 
classical political economy can be seen as liberating political thought, as a part of the 
debates that we now refer to as the onset of modernity.  
 
The problems emerge elsewhere, as matters of conceptual re-interpretation and later 
historical experience. Historically, industrialization transformed economic activity 
giving greater emphasis to “dead” over “living labour” and increasing control over 
work. Conceptually, the metaphor of the “invisible hand” was taken to mean absolute 
market self-regulation – absolute in the sense that individual actions on their own 
generate maximum positive outcome, without other coordination between the actors and 
without being framed by larger societal concerns. This is what Polanyi called 
disembedding, hypostatized both in economics and in the theory of functional 
differentiation. Due to these transformations, the institutions of “modern capitalism” 
became that iron cage the actual building of which was forgotten. 
 
In this vein, our task today is to undo liberal and neoclassical mystifying beliefs on the 
allegedly apolitical origins of social relations. Markets are far from being metaphysical 
entities the origins of which one cannot elucidate, but human creations that emanate 
from specific political options which, in turn, are the outcome of concrete constellations 
of collective aspirations. "'Market', in singular or abstract terms, does not exist; what do 
exist are different forms of markets historically configured as a result of a political 
option – or a set of political options." (Casassas, 2013: 6). This is a key insight from 
Polanyi's work, and evidence for this assertion is found throughout this issue: Jeremy 
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Seekings and Leda Maria Paulani trace political constructions of economic institutions 
and practices through the history of South Africa and Brazil. Sandra Halperin discusses 
both the active dismantling and the re-building of market-framing institutions across 
European history. Antoni Domènech and María Julia Bertomeu's article shows that the 
roots of such a project can be traced back at least to seventeenth-century English 
political thought. 
 
In conclusion, we shall try to briefly reflect on what embedding of the economy can 
mean and what it entails in general terms. We do so with recourse to the modern 
commitment to autonomy and suggest that individual autonomy of economic actors in 
disembedded markets is only one possible modern approach to the satisfaction of needs. 
Its merits and deficiencies needs to be explored in the context of the broader societal 
commitment to autonomy. Autonomy as collective self-determination implies the 
possibility of handling autonomy of needs satisfaction in different ways, only one of 
which is individual autonomy on markets.  
 
In the following reflections, we obviously cannot offer an answer to this question in 
terms of necessary and sufficient institutional settings for such embedding of the 
economy into societal self-determination to unfold – if we did so, we would be 
contradicting our view that institutional concretisations are always radically context-
dependent. Nevertheless, some general criteria can be drawn from what has been 
explored until now – Casassas and De Wispelaere's as well as Pichierri's contributions 
to this volume delve into these issues as well. We concentrate here on three main 
aspects. 
 
19 
 
Firstly, self-determination within the economic realm requires the capacity to 
individually and collectively decide when to commodify resources and activities and 
when to decommodify them. To put it succinctly, there is no general problem with the  
extension of market-based social relations; what can be seen as morally and politically 
problematic is the fact that individuals and groups lack the opportunity to exit or 
remove resources from markets when they deem it as necessary or desirable. As one can 
infer from the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970), having an "exit option" available 
helps secure the freedom-respecting nature of social relations. The right to divorce is not 
something that forces you to divorce, but something that enables you to do so if 
marriage is likely to undermine your freedom and dignity. In the same vein, the 
possibility to decommodify resources and activities – for example, to decommodify the 
labour force – is a possibility individuals and groups may exercise or not, but its 
presence seems to guarantee a higher degree of control over key economic processes. 
Decommodifiability, not actual decommodification, is what appears to be a core 
objective within any project aiming at deepening economic democracy. 
  
Secondly, self-determination within the economic realm requires the effective power to 
collectively establish the nature and running of markets in all those cases where a group 
has decided to resort to the commercial sphere in order to organize certain aspects of its 
life in common. As said before, markets do not work univocally under all sorts of 
circumstances. Markets can allocate resources and shape social life in a myriad of ways 
depending on who is (dis)allowed to do what. Consequently, a set of political decisions 
of great import in terms of world-making is at stake. What exactly can be bought and 
sold? What proportion of the available quantity of the resource? Who can buy and who 
can sell? How should prices be determined? During which periods of time can certain 
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resources be bought and sold? Where should the purchase take place? Needless to say, 
the different answers to all these questions can lead to the emergence of radically 
differential worlds, which places us again facing the unavoidable need to decide. 
  
Thirdly, self-determination within the economic realm requires the introduction of 
political spaces for the democratic control over all these decisions. No concrete politico-
institutional plan should be suggested in this paper; rather, we have focused on saying 
that some politico-institutional action is to be carried out if the goal is an inclusive 
decision-making process on the shape and procedures of our economies. Whether such 
political action is to be based on forms of self-management – and of what kind – or/and 
on sets of public policies – and in which direction – is something that, again, escapes 
the reach of this article. What we are claiming here is that something is to be instituted 
in order to turn economic modernity into a project that is in our hands; and that nothing 
can be instituted without the awareness that the power to imagine instituting moves is 
never limited (Castoriadis, 1987). In our current constellation of modernity and 
capitalism, the modern imaginary of autonomy, in particular collective autonomy, needs 
to be forcefully and urgently mobilized to counteract the increasingly visible disastrous 
consequences of a capitalism that was erroneously conceived as self-steering but is 
clearly out of control. 
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Notes 
                                                          
i  Using Hegelian terminology, Arnason (2015) refers to institutions as “objective spirit”, one of 
three layers of social life. While this is useful, it is less clear whether and how “subjective spirit” and 
“absolute spirit” can be distinguished in a post-Hegelian way. In the following, we merely distinguish 
institutions from interpretations, with the latter term comprising both the subjective assignment of 
meaning to a situation one finds oneself in and cosmologies, the meaning collectively assigned to the 
world, which are different in reach but not in substance. 
ii  Our suggestion of defining the economic problématique as the search for the best way of 
satisfying human material needs has two implications that should be spelt out: It presupposes some 
distinction between material and other needs; and it suggests that the economy is concerned with the 
former only. By material needs we refer to needs such as food, shelter, medical care, education, essential 
to live. Even though the boundary between those needs and others, such as for recognition, may be socio-
historically variable, some such distinction is useful. Relating those needs to economic matters, secondly, 
means using a traditional notion of the economy. Thus, marketization, monetarization or commodification 
are not as such markers of economic matters. They can be means of addressing the economic 
problématique, but the problématique can be addressed by other means as well, as much as these means 
may be employed for other purposes than the satisfaction of material needs.  
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iii  Among recent works, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello's Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme (1999) 
stands out, which focuses on motivations and justifications, but also complements the analysis by drawing 
on insights on “accumulation regimes” from the Regulation School. 
 
